The modern legal profession in India is the product of the legal system that was evolved by the Britishers since the time of the East India Company. Tracing the history of the legal profession in India, we go back to the Mayor’s Courts established in Madras, Bombay and Calcutta in 1726 by a Charter granted by King George I on 24th September, 1726. The proceedings in the Mayor’s Court had to be instituted “upon complaint to be made in writing to the court by, for, or on behalf of any person or persons against any other person or persons then residing within the territories of the Company”. The trial was to be conducted in the Mayor’s Court in the same or the like manner and form as in that part of Great Britain called England. There was no specific provision in the Charter regarding the qualifications of the persons who would be entitled to represent the parties in the suits to act or plead as legal practitioners. It was left to be regulated by the rules of practice that the court was authorized to frame. The procedure was English procedure and the language employed was English. The Mayors Courts functioned upto 1774.

            But prior to the advent of British rule and the rise of British power in India, India had a system of administration of justice in Northern India, established by the Moghul Emperors or the then ruling chiefs. In addition, small Chieftains and big Zamidars had also their courts exercising civil and criminal jurisdictions. There was a class of persons called ‘vakils’ who acted more as agents for principals than as lawyers, whose services were available to the litigants in these indigenous courts. But after the Battle of Plessey in 1957 the East India Company acquired from the Moghul Emperor the Diwani of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa and assumed greater responsibilities than mere commercial aspirations. After arrival of Warren Hastings in 1772, the civil and judicial administration of the mofussil territories outside the town of Calcutta was taken over by the Company.

            In 1774 a Supreme Court was established at Fort William in Bengal with full power and authority to exercise and perform all civil, criminal admiralty and Ecclesiastical jurisdictions by the Regulating Act of 1773. On the establishment of the Supreme Court the mayors Courts came to an end.

Clause 11 of the Charter provided as follows:-
“And we do hereby authorize and empower the said Supreme Court of Judicature, at Fort William in Bengal, to approve, admit and enroll such and so many Advocates and Attorneys-at-Law, as to the said Supreme Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal, shall seem meet, who shall be Attorneys of Record, and shall be, and are hereby authorized to appear and plead, and act for the suitors of the said Supreme Court of Judicature, at Fort William in Bengal and the said advocates and Attorneys, on reasonable cause, to remove; and to other person of persons whatsoever, but such advocates or Attorneys, so admitted and enrolled, shall be allowed to appear and plead, or act in the said Supreme Court of Judicature, at Fort William in Bengal, for or on the behalf of such suitors, or any of them.”

The language of the Supreme Court was English and the Court was directed to give judgments and sentence on the basis of common law and equity. The persons entitled to practice before the court were ‘advocates’ which meant only English and Irish Barristers and  advocates of Scotland and British Attorneys and Solicitors and “no other persons whatsoever”. Thus the Indian legal practitioners had no entry into these courts. Similar Supreme Courts with like jurisdiction were established at Bombay and Madras also. In these Courts also only British Barristers and Attorneys were eligible for enrolment.

The Vakils practising in the Moghul courts subsequently appeared in the Company courts also. The Bengal Regulation VI of 1793 can be said to have created for the first time a regular legal profession for the company’s courts. The Regulation provided for appointment of vakils or native pleaders in the courts of civil judicature in the province of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. It empowered the Sudder Dewanny Adawlat to enroll pleaders for all Company’s Court and to fix the retaining fee for pleaders and also a scale of professional fee based on a percentage of the value of the subject matter. The extraordinary feature of the above Regulations was that only Muslims and Hindus could be enrolled as pleaders. Then came Bengal Regulation XXVII of 1814 which consolidated the law on the subject. The pleaders were empowered to act as arbitrators and to give legal opinions on payment of fees. The next stage was Bengal Regulation XII of 1833 which permitted any qualified person of whatever nationality or religion to be enrolled as a pleader of the Sudder Dewanny Adawlat. The Legal Practitioners Act, 1846 made three important innovations, namely, (1) that people of any nationality or religion became eligible to be pleaders and the office was thrown open to all persons duly certificated; (2) Attorneys and Barristers enrolled in any of Her Majesty’s Courts in India were by Section 3  and 5 respectively made eligible to plead in the Sudder Courts of the Company subject to the rules of those courts as regards language or otherwise; and (3) Pleaders were allowed to enter into agreements with their clients for their fees for professional services. By Section 4 of the Legal Practitioners Act, 1853 (XX of 1853 ) the Barristers and Attorneys of the Supreme Courts were permitted to plead in any of the Courts of the Company’s subordinate courts as regards language or otherwise. While Barristers and Attorneys were thus permitted to practise in the Company’s Courts, the indigenous Indian legal practitioners were rigorously kept out of the three Supreme Courts. Then came the upheaval of 1857. By Act 21 & 22 Vic. C. 106 commonly called the Government of India Act, 1858, the British Crown took over the administration of the territories therefore governed by the Company and the Company thereafter retained only a formal existence for the purpose of its financial liquidation.

The Indian High Courts Act, 1862 was passed by the British Parliament authorizing creation of High Courts by letters patent in the Presidencies in place of the respective Supreme Courts. Section 11 of the Act provided that the existing provisions applicable to the Supreme Courts would continue to be applicable to the new High Courts. The High Courts were given a general power of superintendence over the civil and criminal courts in the Moffusil. Clause 9 of the Letters Patent of 1865 provided as follows:-

“9 And we do hereby authorize and empower the said High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal to approve, admit and enroll such and so many Advocates, Vakils, and attorneys as to the said High Court shall seem meet; and such Advocates, Vakils and Attorneys shall be and are hereby authorized to appear for the suitors of the said High Court, and to plead or to act, or plead and act for the said suitors, according as the said High Court may by its rules and directions determine, and subject to such rules and directions”

As regards a High Court not established by Royal Charter,  Sec 41 of the Legal Practitioners Act, 1879 empowered such High Court, with the previous sanction of the Provincial Government, to make rules as to the qualifications and admission of proper persons to be Advocates of the Court. Section 10 of the Punjab Chief Court Act of 1966 laid down qualifications of persons who were permitted to appear and act as Pleaders in the Chief Court. Section 10 reads as follows:-

“Any person duly authorized by the Sectary of State for India in Council to appear, plead or act on his behalf; (2) any suitor appearing, pleading, or acting on his own behalf or on behalf of a co-suitor; (3) any person who, for the time being, is an Advocate, Vakil or Attorney-at-law of any of the High Courts of Judicature in India or of Sudder Court of the North-Western Provinces, shall be permitted to appear and act as the Pleader of any suitor in the Chief Court in any suit or touching any matter whatever. Save as aforesaid, no person shall be permitted to appear or act as the Pleader of any suitor in the Chief Court in any suit or touching any matter whatever, unless such person shall have been previously licensed by the Court to act for the suitors of such Court generally, or specially for the particular occasion. It shall be lawful for the judges to make rules for the qualifications and admission of proper persons to act as Pleaders in the Court.”

There were two classes of pleaders (1) pleaders of the first grade entitled to practice before the Chief Court and (2) pleaders of the second grade entitled to practice before the subordinate courts. The qualifications for admission as a second grade Pleader was a Diploma for having passed the “Licentiate-in-Law” examination held by the University which was open to students who had gone through a course of teaching in the Law College extending over three years. After practicing in the Subordinate Courts for two years, Pleaders of the second grade were eligible to be enrolled as Pleaders of the first grade. Rules were also framed for admission of Mukhtars. Under the Rules as amended in 1890 Mukhtars of the First Grade were permitted to appear in the Chief Court. A noteworthy feature was that unlike in Bengal and other provinces, a Mukhtar in the Punjab could appear before Subordinate Civil Courts and also in Criminal Courts. Fresh recruitment of Mukhtars in the Punjab was stopped in 1914 but those who had been already enrolled were permitted to continue to  practise as before. 

The other class of lawyers in the High Court was called ‘Vakils” . The qualification required for admission as a Vakil in Calcutta were the degree of Bachelor of Arts or Science followed by the degree of Bachelor of Laws and two years’ service as an Articled Clerk. The High Courts of Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, Allahbad and Patna all have prescribed qualifications for enrolment of Attorneys. Besides the Advocates, Attorneys and Vakils of the High Courts there were different classes of legal practitioners ordinarily practising in the District and other subordinate courts. All these different legal practitioners of the High Court, except the Attorneys and those of the subordinate courts except the Revenue Agents were subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the High Courts under the Legal Practitioners’ Act 1879.  The Revenue Agents were liable to be suspended or removed from practice by the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority.

            The Legal Practitioners Act, 1879, by Section 4 empowered an Advocate or Vakil on the roll of any High Court or a Pleader of the Chief Court of the Punjab to Practise in all the courts subordinate to the court on the roll of which he was entered and in all Revenue Offices situate within the local limits of the appellate jurisdiction of such Court subject to the rules in force relating to the language of the Court and also to practise in any Court in British India other than a High Court on whose roll he was not entered or with the permission of the Court in any High Court on whose roll he was not entered  and in any Revenue Office. There was a proviso, however, to the section to the effect that this power would not extend to the Original Jurisdiction of the High Court in a Presidency Town. Section 5 enabled an Attorney on the roll of any High Court to practise in all the Courts subordinate to such High Court and in all Revenue Offices within the appellate jurisdiction of such High Court and also to practise in any court in British India other than a High Court on the roll of which he was entered and in any Revenue Court. These two sections certainly constituted a wide enlargement of the rights of the Advocates, Vakils and Attorneys of the High Court in that they enabled those legal practitioners to exercise their profession in all Subordinate Courts in India.  In the Madras High Court there remained no distinction between Barristers, Vakils and Attorneys as regards their right to appear and plead on the original side, but the Advocates had to be instructed by an Attorney. In the Bombay High Court the original side was initially an exclusive area set apart for Barristers as in the Caluctta High Court. The Vakils were not originally permitted to act or plead in the High Court. But later the rule was released and a non-Barrister on passing an examination conducted by the High Court became eligible for enrolment as Advocate entitled to appear and plead on the original side in the High Court. But the Advocates of the original side had to be instructed by an Attorney. In the other High Courts there was no original side and so there was no distinction between the Advocates who were mainly Barristers and the Vakils of the High Courts in the matter of right to appear, act and plead.

            In the Supreme Courts the British Barristers and Advocates alone could be enrolled as Advocates and British Solicitors alone could be enrolled as Attorneys. Indians, therefore, started going to England to qualify for the Bar or as Solicitors and to get enrolled in the Supreme Court. Although Indians began to go to England and on return were enrolled in the Supreme Courts and later on in the High Courts as Advocates or Solicitors as the case may be, the British Barristers and Solicitors predominated on the Original Side for a considerable time. Thus in 1871 there were in Bombay 38 Solicitors of whom only 10 were Indians and the rest were English and 24 Advocates out of whom only 7 were Indians and the rest were English. Gradually, however, the bulk of the practice on the Original Side passed from the hands of the English Barristers to those of the Indian barristers. Thus in 1911 there were practicing in Bombay 150 Solicitors out of whom 130 were Indians. The High Courts other than the three in the Presidency towns had no Original Side and made no distinction between their Advocates and Vakils respecting their right to act and plead in the High Courts and the Courts subordinate thereto. In Madras after 1886 there was no distinction between the Advocates and the Vakils all of whom could act and plead in the High Court and in all subordinate courts. The Bombay High Court had at an early date thrown open its Original Side to non-Barristers who could pass a special examination. It was only in the Calcutta High Court that the Vakils were rigidly excluded from the Original side. The Vakils, who could count amongst their number  very many eminent lawyers and jurists resented what they regarded as the inferior status of a Vakil.

            The demand for the removal of distinctions between the Barristers and Vakils and the creation of an all – India Bar was undoubtedly at its inception a protest by the members of the Vakil Bar against what they conceived to be an inferior status assigned to them as a class. Their grievances then were against the Barristers only.  In response to the pressure of the indigenous legal profession, the Government of India eventually in November 1923 set up the Indian Bar Committee, popularly known as the Chamier Committee under the Chairmanship of Sir Edward Chamier, a retired Chief Justice of Patna High Court and the then Legal Adviser and Solicitor to the Secretary of State. The Committee was asked to examine and report :-

1. The proposals made from time to time for constituting an Indian Bar, whether on an all India or Provincial basis, with particular reference to the constitution, statutory recognition functions and authority of a Bar Council or Bar Councils, and their position vis-à-vis High Courts.
2. The extent to which it might be possible to remove the existing distinctions enforced by statute or practice between Barristers and Vakils.

The Chamier Committee submitted its report on the Ist February 1924. It did not consider it practicable to organize the Bar on an all-India basis or to constitute an all-India Bar Council. It dealt only with the Pleaders and Mukhtars except by stating that the enrolment of and control over them should be left to the High Court under the Bombay Pleaders Act, 1920, in Bombay, and under the Legal Practitioners Act, 1879, in other places. It noticed with satisfaction the process of gradual disappearance of the practitioners with low qualifications whose practice was confined to the Subordinate Courts and expressed the hope that a time would come when there would be in each Province a single grade of practitioners entitled to appear in all Courts from the High Court to the lowest Revenue Court. To give effect to the part of the recommendations of the Chamier Committee relating to the establishment of Bar Councils , the Central Legislature enacted the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926.

            Section 3 to 7 of the Act had provided for the constitution and incorporation of a Bar Council as a body corporate and the powers of making rules regarding the same and bye-laws regarding appointment of ministerial officers and servants and their pay and allowances and constitution of committees and their procedure. Section 8 as amended by Act XIII of 1927 directs the High Courts to prepare and maintain a roll of Advocates of the High Court, and prescribes the order of seniority as recommended by the Chamier Committee. The Attorneys of the High Court, however, are not to be entered in this roll. Section 9 authorized the Bar Council, with the previous sanction of the High Court, to make rules to regulate the admission of persons to be Advocates of the High Court to refuse admission to any person at its discretion.

It could be seen from the above that the power of enrolment of Advoctes continued to remain in the High Court and the function of the bar Council was of an advisory nature only. Each of the High Courts as well as the Bar Councils of Calcutta and Bombay have made rules to the effect that Advocates of the other High Courts would be permitted to appear and plead in the respective High Courts only after obtaining permission of the Chief Justice concerned. This limitation was regarded as unsatisfactory, since on several occasions very eminent Advocates of one High Court had been refused permission to appear and plead in another High Court.

            The Chamier Committee’s Report and the Indian Bar Councils Act, however, had left the Pleaders, Mukhtars and Revenue Agents practicing in the Mofussil Courts and Revenue Offices entirely out of consideration and did not bring about a unified Indian Bar. Further, the Bar Councils constituted under the Indian Bar Councils Act were merely advisory bodies and were neither autonomous nor had any substantial authority. This did not satisfy the legal profession and piecemeal attempts at amendment of the Legal Practitioners Act and/ or the Indian Bar Councils Act were made from time to time without any success.

            The Constitution of India came into force on 26th January 1950 and all High Courts of Part B states became High Courts under the Constitution. In February – March 1950 the Inter University Board at its annual meeting held in Madras passed a resolution emphasizing the desirability of having uniformly high standards for the law examinations in  the different Universities of the country in view of the fact that under the new Constitution a Supreme Court of India had been established and stressing the need for an all India Bar. In May 1950 the Madras Provincial Lawyers Conference held under the presidency of Shri s Varadachariar resolved that the Government of India should appoint a Committee for the purpose of evolving a scheme for an all-India Bar and amending the Indian Bar Councils Act to bring it into conformity with the new Constitution. The Bar Council of Madras at its meeting held on  1st October 1950, adopted that resolution. Shri Syed Mohammed Ahmad Kazmi, M.P. who is a member of the present Committee, introduced in Parliament on April 12, 1951, a comprehensive Bill to amend the Bar Councils Act.

The demand for a unified all-India Bar, at its inception, came mainly if not wholly, as a protest against the monopoly of the British Barristers on the Original sides of Calcutta and Bombay and the invidious distinctions between the Barristers and non-Barristers. That monopoly later completely disappeared and those irksome distinctions creating discriminations against the members of the indigenous Indian Bar have all been done away with. Nevertheless, the advent of independence has given a new orientation to the claim for an autonomous unified all India Bar. It is no longer a protest for redressing grievances as before, but it is a claim for the fulfillment of a cherished ideal. The sense of unity fondly fostered amongst the members of the legal fraternity in India has received added stimulation by the political unity of India brought about by our newly won independence and the establishment of the Supreme Court of India. In this situation the Government of India took the view that in the changed circumstances a comprehensive Bill sponsored by the Government was necessary and to that end in August 1951 the then Minister of Law announced on the floor of the House that the Government of India were considering a proposal to set up a Committee of Inquiry to go into the problem in detail. To comply with that promise the all India Bar Committee was constituted by the Government of India. The Committee was asked to examine and report on :-

1. The desirability and feasibility of a completely unified Bar for the whole of India.
2. The continuance or abolition of the dual system of counsel and solicitor (or agent) which obtains in the Supreme court and in the High Courts at Bomaby and Calcutta.
3. The continuance or abolition of different classes of legal practitioners, like advocates of the Supreme Court, advocates of the various High Courts, district court pleaders, mukhtars (entitled to practice in criminal courts only), revenue agents, income – tax practitioners, etc.;
4. The desirability and feasibility of establishing a single Bar Council
1. For the whole of India, or
2. For each State.
5. the establishment of a separate Bar Council for the Supreme Court;
6. the consolidation and revision of the various enactments (Central as well as State) relating to legal practitioners; and
7. all other connected matters.

The All India bar Committee was headed by Hon’ble shri S. R. Das, Judge, Supreme Court of India as Chairman. The Committee consisted of the following members:-

1. Shri M. C. Setalvd, Attorney General of India.
2. Dr. Bakshi Tek Chand, Retired High Court Judge.
3. Shri V. K. T. Chari, Advocate-Gernal of Madras,
4. Shri V. Rajaram Aiyar, Advocate-General of Hyderabad.
5. Shri Syed . A Kazmi, MP, Advocate, Allahabad
6. Shri C. C. Shah, MP., Solicitor, Bombay
7. Shri D. M. Bhandari, MP, Advocate, Rajasthan High Court.

After considering all aspects of the subject matter, the All India Bar Committee submitted its detailed report on 30th March 1953. The report inter alia contained the proposals for constituting the State Bar Council for each State and an All India Bar Council on the National Level as the Apex Body for regulating the legal profession  as well as supervise the standard of legal education in India. In the meanwhile the Law Commission of  India was also assigned the job of preparing a report on the reforms of judicial administration. To implement the recommendations of the All India Bar Committee and taking into account the recommendations of  the Law Commission in so far as the same relate to the legal profession and legal education a comprehensive Advocates Bill was introduced in the Parliament, which has resulted in the “The Advocates Act, 1961” the present law that governs the twin areas of legal profession and legal education in India, under which the self regulatory statutory bodies, viz.,  the State as well as All India Bar Councils function. This is the brief history of the modern legal profession in India as it exists today, traced through various important developments. Therefore, this narration has not covered the indigenous system of representation of parties by scholarly persons in the dispute resolution system which was prevalent in this ancient land which had a glorious past and proud heritage in all walks of life including dispute resolution, prior to the advent of Moghul rule and going back to the Vedic period.